M.L.B. v. S.L.J.: Extension of in forma pauperis Appeals to the Civil Arena in Termination of Parental Rights Cases - Creation of a Vast New Constitutional Right or Limited Exception to the General Rule by Moore, Rick
Mississippi College Law Review 
Volume 18 
Issue 1 Vol. 18 Iss. 1 Article 5 
1998 
M.L.B. v. S.L.J.: Extension of in forma pauperis Appeals to the 
Civil Arena in Termination of Parental Rights Cases - Creation of a 
Vast New Constitutional Right or Limited Exception to the General 
Rule 
Rick Moore 
Follow this and additional works at: https://dc.law.mc.edu/lawreview 
 Part of the Law Commons 
Custom Citation 
18 Miss. C. L. Rev. 19 (1997-1998) 
This Article is brought to you for free and open access by MC Law Digital Commons. It has been accepted for 
inclusion in Mississippi College Law Review by an authorized editor of MC Law Digital Commons. For more 
information, please contact walter@mc.edu. 
ML.B. v. S.L.J: EXTENSION OF informapauperis APPEALS TO THE
CIVIL ARENA IN TERMINATION OF PARENTAL RIGHTS CASES
Creation of a vast new constitutional right
or limited exception to the general rule?
Rick Moore*
This Article discusses the decision by the United States Supreme Court in
M.L.B. v. S.L.J' holding that an indigent, appealing a termination of parental
rights decree, is entitled to an in forma pauperis appeal at state expense.2
Section I of this Article discusses the factual background of the case. Section I
focuses on the opinion of the Court. Section III addresses the anticipated impli-
cations of the decision, and Section IV is a personal account of the experience of
preparing and arguing a case before the highest court in the land.
I. FACTS
M.L.B. and S.L.J. were divorced on June 9, 1992, with S.L.J. being granted the
paramount physical and legal custody of their minor children, ages seven and
nine.' While the final decree of divorce allowed M.L.B. reasonable and liberal
visitation rights with the minor children, it also specifically provided that "in no
event and under no circumstances shall the wife exercise her visitation with said
minor children in the presence of" a specifically named individual.4
Additionally, M.L.B. was ordered to pay $40.00 a week child support beginning
May 1, 1992, to maintain medical insurance on the children and to pay half of all
medical bills not covered by the insurance policy.'
Seventeen months later, on November 15, 1993, S.L.J. and his new wife, J.PJ.,
filed a complaint for adoption in the Chancery Court of Benton County,
Mississippi, seeking to terminate the parental rights of petitioner, M.L.B., and to
allow J.P.J. to adopt the minor children.' The complaint alleged that M.L.B. had
abandoned and deserted the children, was mentally and physically unfit to train
and rear the children, had refused to offer any means of support for the children
since the divorce, and had failed to exercise any reasonable visitation rights, even
though they were available to her.7
The chancery judge, after hearing testimony and evidence on August 18,
November 2, and December 12, 1994, ruled that the adoption should be granted.8
* B.A. 1974, J.D. 1978, University of Mississippi; Private practice, 1978-1985; Mississippi Special Assistant
Attorney General, Universities, Transportation, and Civil Litigation Divisions, 1985 to present. The opinions
expressed in this article are those of the author only and not necessarily those of his employer.
1. 117 S. Ct. 555 (1996).
2. This Article is limited to a discussion of the constitutional basis for the opinion in M.L.B. v. S.L.J. and
should not be construed as addressing or taking any position on the propriety of legislative enactment in this
area.
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The judge found that it had been established by clear and convincing evidence
that there existed "a substantial erosion of the relationship between the natural
mother and the minor children" which had been caused, at least in part, by peti-
tioner's "serious neglect, abuse, prolonged and unreasonable absence or unrea-
sonable failure to visit or communicate with the minor children."9 M.L.B. filed a
notice of appeal to the Supreme Court of Mississippi on January 11, 1995.0
Civil appeals, which are authorized pursuant to state statutes," are subject to
prerequisites such as the requirement of timely notice,12 prepayment of cost,13
and in some cases, posting of bond.14 The per page costs of the transcript and the
papers from the record are set by statute. A notice of appeal is filed with the
Supreme Court of Mississippi, which thereafter determines whether to retain the
case or send it to the intermediate Mississippi Court of Appeals for decision. '6 A
decision of the court of appeals is a final decision unless the Supreme Court of
Mississippi grants review pursuant to a writ of certiorari.1
The clerk of the chancery court estimated the cost of preparing and transmit-
ting the record to be $2,352.36, which included $1,900.00 for the transcript,
$438.00 for the other papers in the record, $4.36 for binders, and $10.00 for
mailing. 8 A transcript must be prepared if the appellant "intends to urge on
appeal that a finding or conclusion is unsupported by the evidence or is contrary
to the evidence."1 9 The transcript is prepared by the court reporter who is paid
two dollars per page.2
On July 10, 1995, the Supreme Court of Mississippi issued an order requiring
M.L.B., within fourteen days, to correct certain deficiencies or face dismissal of
her appeal.21 On July 24, 1995, M.L.B. filed a motion for leave to appeal in
forma pauperis in the Chancery Court of Benton County, Mississippi.
2 2
Thereafter, on July 27, 1995, M.L.B. filed in the Supreme Court of Mississippi a
motion to suspend rules, for leave to appeal in forma pauperis, and to brief the
issue of informa pauperis appeals.23
On August 18, 1995, the Supreme Court of Mississippi issued an order deny-
ing the motion to suspend rules, for leave to appeal in forma pauperis, and to
brief the issue of in forma pauperis appeals.24 The decision was based on prior
cases which concluded that the right to proceed in forma pauperis in civil cases
9. M.L.B. v. S.L.J., 117 S. Ct. 555, 559 (1996). See Miss. CODE ANN. §§ 93-15-103, -17-7 (1972).
10. M.L.B., 117 S. Ct. at 560.
11. MISS. CODE ANN. § 11-51-3 (1972).
12. Miss. R. App. P. 4.
13. MISS. CODE ANN. § 11-51-29 (1972); Miss. R. ApP. P. 1 (b)(1).
14. MISS. CODEANN. § 11-51-31 (1972).
15. MISS. CODE ANN. §§ 25-7-1, -7-13(6) (1972).
16. Miss. R. App. P. 16.
17. Miss. R. APP. P. 17.
18. M.L.B. v. S.L.J., 117 S. Ct. 555, 560 (1996).
19. Miss. R. APP. P. 10(b)(2).
20. MISS. CODE ANN. § 25-7-89 (Supp. 1997).
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exists only at the trial level.2" An order of final dismissal was entered on August
31, 1995.2 M.L.B. then filed a petition for writ of certiorari, and on April 1,
1996, the United States Supreme Court granted the writ. 7
II. THE OPINION OF THE COURT
On December 16, 1996, the United States Supreme Court, in 'a six to three
decision, held that an indigent seeking to appeal a termination of parental rights
decree is entitled to have the costs of the appeal paid with public funds.28 The
majority opinion was based upon an amalgamation of the Due Process and Equal
Protection Clauses of the Fourteenth Amendment and an extension to the civil
arena of a line of criminal cases beginning with Griffin v. Illinois,2 and including
Mayer v. Chicago.30
The majority opinion in Griffin held that an indigent criminal defendant must
be provided with a free transcript when an appeal of right exists." The Court
based its decision on both the Due Process and Equal Protection Clauses of the
Fourteenth Amendment, refusing to choose between them. The reasoning of
Griffin was used in several later cases to invalidate various state statutes and
practices which were deemed to impede or deny indigent criminal defendants'
effective appeals.32 This line of cases culminated with the decision in Mayer v.
City of Chicago' holding that an indigent faced only with a $500 misdemeanor
fine and no jail time was entitled to a free transcript for appeal purposes. The
Court distinguished Mayer from a civil case by acknowledging that the practical
effect of conviction of even a petty offense could be as detrimental to the accused
as forced confinement.
34
Like the opinions in Griffin and Mayer, the majority in M.L.B. noted that the
requirement imposed on the State was limited to a record of sufficient complete-
25. M.L.B. v. S.L.J., 117 S. Ct. 555, 560 (1996). See Ortwein v. Schwab, 410 U.S. 656 (1973); Moreno v.
State, 637 So. 2d 200 (Miss. 1994); Nelson v. Bank of Miss., 498 So. 2d 365 (Miss. 1986); Life and Cas. Ins.
Co. v. Walters, 200 So. 732 (Miss. 1941).
26. Respondent's Brief at 3, M.L.B. v. S.L.J., 117 S. Ct. 555 (1996) (No. 95-853).
27. Id.
28. M.L.B., 117 S. Ct. at 570.
29. 351 U.S. 12 (1956).
30. 404U.S. 189(1971).
31. Grifffin, 351 U.S. at 18. The Court concluded that "ft]here is no meaningful distinction between a rule
which would deny the poor the right to defend themselves in a trial court and one which effectively denies the
poor an adequate appellate review accorded to all who have money enough to pay the costs in advance." Id.
32. See, e.g., Bounds v. Smith, 430 U.S. 817, 828 (1977) (requiring prison law libraries or legal assistance);
Williams v. Oklahoma City, 395 U.S. 458, 458-59 (1969) (per curiam) (requiring the provision of a transcript in
a case involving an appeal of a sentence of 90 days in jail and a $50 fine for drunk driving); Long v. District
Court of Iowa, Lee County, 385 U.S. 192, 192-94 (1966) (per curiam) (requiring the provision of a transcript
for indigent state habeas corpus petitioner who appeals denial of relief); Douglas v. California, 372 U.S. 353,
356-58 (1963) (requiring free appellate counsel indigents on first appeal); Smith v. Bennett, 365 U.S. 708, 708-
09 (1961) (requiring waiver of filing fee for state habeas corpus application of indigents); Burns v. Ohio, 360
U.S, 252, 253, 257-58 (1959) (requiring waiver of appeal filing fee from state intermediate appellate court to
state supreme court).
33. 404 U.S. 189 (1971).
34. Id. at 197.
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ness to allow proper appellate consideration of the grounds for appeal.3"
However, since a transcript is necessary in those appeals urging that "a finding or
conclusion is unsupported by the evidence or is contrary to the evidence,"3 this
exception is an illusion as a practical matter. 7 Furthermore, past attempts by
states to find a balance between an indigent appellant's rights and the expendi-
ture of public funds have been invalidated by the Court."
The Court accorded M.L.B. a free appellate transcript because the interest she
sought to preserve on appeal was deemed to be as important as the misdemeanor
charge sought to be appealed in Mayer. The majority attempted to assure that its
holding in this case would not extend beyond termination of parental rights, not-
ing that the decisions in Santosky v. Kramer39 and Lassiter v. Department of
Social Services of Durham County" have not been applied to other areas of the
law.4' However, as pointed out by the dissent, if the right to a free appellate tran-
script is based upon having an interest equivalent to that of a convicted misde-
meanant, then many other interests involved in civil litigation appear to meet the
standard.42 Those cases include paternity suits,43 divorce actions,"' child custody
determinations," challenges to zoning ordinances that impact families,46 and
foreclosure actions seeking to oust families from their homes.47
The majority relied on an amalgamation of the Due Process and Equal
Protection Clauses for its opinion despite its acknowledgment that "[a] 'precise
35. M.L.B. v. S.L.J., 117 S. Ct. 555, 561 n.5 (1996). See Griffin, 351 U.S. at 20 (holding that transcript may
not have to be provided by the State if "adequate and effective appellate review to indigent defendants" can be
afforded by other means); Mayer, 404 U.S. at 194 ("'A record of sufficient completeness' does not translate
automatically into a complete verbatim transcript.").
36. Miss. R. App. P. 10(b)(2).
37. It is inconceivable that any appeal of a termination of parental rights decree would fail to allege that the
finding or conclusions are unsupported by the evidence or are contrary to the evidence.
38. See, e.g., Draper v. Washington, 372 U.S. 487, 498-500 (1963) (invalidating a state rule that conditioned
an indigent appellant's right to obtain a free transcript on the trial judge's finding that the appeal would not be
frivolous).
39. 455 U.S. 745 (1982). Santosky held that a "clear and convincing" standard of proof must be used in a
termination of parental fights case. "Unlike a constitutional requirement of hearings ... or court-appointed
counsel, a stricter standard of proof would reduce factual error without imposing substantial fiscal burdens
upon the State." Id. at 767 (citing Mathews v. Eldridge, 424 U.S. 319, 347 (1976)).
40. 452 US. 18 (1981). Lassiter addressed the question of when an indigent might be entitled to court
appointed counsel in a termination of parental rights case. The Court concluded that each case would have to
be considered on its own merit. Id. at 31-32.
41. M.L.B. v. S.L.J., 117 S. Ct. 555, 570 (1996).
42. M.L.B., 117 S. Ct. at 576-77 (Thomas, J., dissenting).
43. In Little v. Streater, 452 U.S. 1 (1981), the Supreme Court held that the State had to provide a free blood
grouping test to an indigent defendant in a paternity action. The Court based its decision on the conclusion that:
Apart from the putative father's pecuniary interest in avoiding a substantial support obligation and
liberty interest threatened by the possible sanctions for noncompliance, at issue is the creation of a
parent-child relationship. This Court frequently has stressed the importance of familial bonds,
whether or not legitimized by marriage, and accorded them constitutional protection. Just as the ter-
mination of such bonds demands procedural fairness, so too does their imposition.
Id. at 13 (citations omitted).
44. See Zakrewski v. Fox, 87 F.3d 1011, 1013-14 (8th Cir. 1996) (holding that the father's "liberty interest in
the care, custody and management of his son has been substantially reduced by the terms of the divorce decree
and Nebraska law").
45. See Boddie v. Connecticut, 401 U.S. 371, 382-83 (1971) (stating that divorce is an "adjustment of a fun-
damental human relationship").
46. See Moore v. City of East Cleveland, 431 U.S. 494 (1977).
47. See, e.g., Lindsey v. Normet, 405 U.S. 56, 89 (1972) (Douglas, J., dissenting in part) ("Where the right is
so fundamental as the tenant's claim to his home, the requirements of due process should be more embracing.").
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rationale' has not been composed because cases of this order 'cannot be resolved
by resort to easy slogans or pigeonhole analysis."'" However, as pointed out by
the dissent, if neither clause individually affords the requested relief, it is
assumed that no combination of the two can afford the requested relief. 9
A. Due Process
The United States Supreme Court has repeatedly held that due process does
not require an appeal process, even in criminal cases.50 This conclusion was reaf-
firmed in M.L.B.51 The majority, relying on the theory developed in Griffin, held
that a combination of the Due Process and Equal Protection Clauses of the
Fourteenth Amendment creates a right to an informa pauperis appeal in termina-
tion of parental rights cases.52 The majority in Griffin relied on this theory for its
conclusion that when a state creates an appeal process it cannot deny access to
those appealing a criminal conviction who are unable to pay. 3 To the contrary,
the dissent in M.L.B.54 argued that the Griffin line of cases is actually grounded
in equal protection rather than a combination of equal protection and due
process.
5s
Prior to the decision in M.L.B., appellate rights accorded to criminal defen-
dants had not been extended to civil cases. In fact, such rights were denied to
civil appellants in Ortwein v. Schwab, 6 the only previous case to address the
right of an indigent to an appeal in a civil case. In Ortwein, the Court held that
Oregon's $25 appellate court filing fee: (1) was not a denial of due process,
because the petitioners received agency pre-termination evidentiary hearings; 7
(2) did not violate the Equal Protection Clause, as unconstitutionally discriminat-
ing against the poor, because the fee was rationally justified to meet court
expenses; 8 and (3) did not violate the Equal Protection Clause as arbitrary and
capricious in allowing others to appeal in forma pauperis.' The Court specifi-
cally rejected reliance on Boddie v. Connecticut," noting that Boddie "was not
48. M.L.B.v.S.L.J., 117 S. Ct. 555, 566 (1996) (citations omitted), (quoting, Ross v. Moffitt, 417 U.S. 600,
608 (1974)).
49. Id. (Thomas, J., dissenting).
50. See, e.g., Griffin v. Illinois, 351 U.S. 12, 18 (1956) (holding that "a State is not required by the Federal
Constitution to provide appellate courts or a right to appellate review at all"); District of Columbia v. Clawans,
300 U.S. 617, 627 (1937) ("Due process does not comprehend the right of appeal."); Ohio ex rel. Bryant v.
Akron Metro. Park Dist., 281 U.S. 74, 80 (1930) ("[T]he right of appeal is not essential to due process, provid-
ed that due process has already been accorded in the tribunal of first instance.").
51. M.L.B., 117 S. Ct. at 560-61.
52. Id.
53. Griffin, 351 US. at 18-20.
54. M.L.B., 117 S. Ct. at 571 (Thomas, J., dissenting).
55. See also Lewis v. Casey, 116 S. Ct. 2174 (1996) (Thomas, J., concurring).
56. 410 U.S. 656 (1973).
57. Id. at 659-60.
58. Id. at 660.
59. Id. at 661.
60. 401 U.S. 371 (1971). The Court held that indigents seeking a divorce must be allowed access to the trial
court without payment of filing fees. The decision was based primarily on the principle that due process
requires that those persons who are forced into the judicial process "must be given a meaningful opportunity to
be heard." Id. at 377.
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concerned with post-hearing review."61 Subsequent cases confirmed the different
treatment between civil and criminal cases. For example, in United States v.
Kras, the Court rejected a challenge to a filing fee by an indigent debtor who
sought access to bankruptcy court.
62
Two subsequent cases, Lassiter v. Department of Social Services3 and
Santosky v. Kramer," dealt specifically with termination of parental rights. The
decisions in both of those cases implicitly recognized that the magnitude of per-
sonal interests in a criminal case is much greater than in a termination of parental
rights case. In Lassiter, the Court considered and rejected the contention that
termination of parental rights cases should be treated like criminal cases for due
process purposes.6 Plaintiff, an indigent, argued that she had been denied
Fourteenth Amendment Due Process when the State failed to provide counsel in
her termination of parental rights case. 6 The Court pursued a two-step inquiry.
First, it held that prior criminal and civil due process decisions establish a pre-
sumption that "an indigent litigant has a right to appointed counsel only when, if
he loses, he may be deprived of his physical liberty." 7 This presumption was
balanced against the Mathews v. Eldridge' factors of state interest, private inter-
est, and risk of error in existing procedures.69 The majority concluded that a par-
ent's interest in the custody and care of his or her child is a compelling one, the
termination of which "work[s] a unique kind of deprivation."7 However, it was
concluded that the absence of counsel did not render the hearing "fundamentally
unfair" and did not deprive Lassiter of due process.1
In Santosky, the Court held that a "clear and convincing" standard of proof
must be used in termination of parental rights cases.72 It was concluded that "a
stricter standard of proof would reduce factual error without imposing substantial
fiscal burdens upon the State."73 By requiring an intermediate standard of proof
between "preponderance of the evidence," normally used in civil cases, and
"beyond a reasonable doubt" required in criminal cases, the only reasonable
interpretation is that the Court concluded that the magnitude of the interests in a
termination of parental rights case is greater than in civil cases but less than in
criminal cases. The greater magnitude of interest involved in criminal cases is
acknowledged by the Court in Santosky. It provides that:
61. Ortwein, 410 U.S. at 659.
62. United States v. Kras, 409 U.S. 434, 440 (1973).
63. 452 U.S. 18 (1981).
64. 455 U.S. 745 (1982).
65. Lassiter, 452 U.S. at 26-27.
66. Id. at 24.
67. Id. at 27. This presumption was derived from Gagnon v. Scarpelli, 411 U.S. 778 (1973), in which the
Court declined to grant indigent probationers an absolute right to counsel at probation revocation proceedings
and from Scott v. Illinois, 440 U.S. 367 (1979), in which the Court refused to require counsel for an indigent
criminal defendant whose conviction did not result in imprisonment.
68. 424 U.S. 319 (1976).
69. Lassiter, 452 U.S. at 27.
70. Id.
71. Id. at 33.
72. Santosky v. Kramer, 455 U.S. 745, 769 (1982).
73. Id. at 767.
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When the State brings a criminal action to deny a defendant liberty or life, how-
ever, the "interests of the defendant are of such magnitude that historically and
without any explicit constitutional requirement they have been protected by
standards of proof designed to exclude as nearly as possible the likelihood of an
erroneous judgment."74
Such a conclusion also finds support in a concurring opinion in Griffin, which
pointed out:
This Court would have to be wilfully blind not to know that there have in the
past been prejudicial trial errors which called for reversal of convictions of indi-
gent defendants, and that the number of those who have not had the means for
paying for the cost of a bill of exceptions is not so negligible as to invoke what-
ever truth there may be in the maxim de minimis.7"
Both the Constitution and the history of legal aspects of the parent-child rela-
tionship support the conclusion that the magnitude of personal interests involved
in criminal cases is much greater than the interests involved in termination of
parental rights cases. Specifically, the Constitution provides numerous express
protections to criminal defendants that are not available to civil litigants. These
include grand jury indictment and protection against double jeopardy and self-
incrimination as guaranteed by the Fifth Amendment; speedy and public jury
trial, ability to confront witnesses, and compulsory process and assistance of
counsel as guaranteed by the Sixth Amendment; and protections against exces-
sive bail and fines, and against cruel and unusual punishment as guaranteed by
the Eighth Amendment.76
The Constitutional guarantees accorded a criminal defendant are in stark con-
trast to the history of the legal relationship between parents and their children.
For example, in Colonial America the parent was considered an agent of the
community given the job of raising desirable and productive citizens." Widely
varied laws were passed by different communities to ensure that the parents per-
formed their obligations. If the parents failed in their responsibilities, the child
was removed from the home.78 The parent-child relationship was not mentioned
in the Constitution because the diversity of values on the issue could not be
encompassed in one simple formula.79
The proper analysis for due process challenges to state civil statutes and proce-
dures, at least at the trial court level, was established in Mathews v. Eldridge."
This case required a two-step analysis to determine if "fundamental fairness"
was met in a particular situation. First, a court must determine whether the chal-
74. Id. at 755 (citation omitted).
75. Griffin v. Illinois, 351 U.S. 12, 23 (1956) (Frankfurter, J., concurring).
76. M.L.B. v. S.L.J., 117 S. Ct. 555, 575 (1996) (Thomas, J., dissenting).
77. JEANNE M. GiovANNoNm & RosINA M. BEcERRA, DEFINING CHILD ABUSE 38 (1979).
78. Id.
79. See Id. at 31-75 (for an extensive discussion of the legal relationship between
parents, their children, and the state).
80. 424 U.S. 319 (1976).
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lenged state action implicates a protected property or liberty interest. 1 If such a
protected interest is involved, the court must then determine what process is due
before an individual may be deprived of that interest.2 The second determina-
tion may be made by applying the four-part test established in Mathews.' The
court must first assess "the private interest that will be affected by the official
action"; second, determine "the risk of an erroneous deprivation of such interest
through the procedures used"; third, determine "the probable value, if any, of
additional or substitute procedural safeguards"; and fourth, consider "the
Government's interest, including the function involved and the fiscal and admin-
istrative burdens that the additional or substitute procedural requirements would
entail."8"
This process requires the "fairness and reliability of the existing procedures"
be considered before a determination can be made that the Constitution requires
more.88 This broad inquiry is necessary to determine whether the procedure used
satisfies the "fundamental fairness" requirement of due process. 6 In that regard,
Mississippi law provides extensive safeguards to assure accurate decisions at the
trial court level. A petition for termination of parental rights may be filed only in
"the county in which a defendant or the child resides, or in the county where an
agency or institution holding custody of the child is located."87 "[T]he mother of
the child, the legal father of the child, and/or the putative father of the child,
when known, must be made parties defendant."' A guardian ad litem must be
appointed to represent the interests of the child.88 The petition is not triable by
the chancery court until thirty days after service of process is complete.90
Findings of fact are made by a chancery judge sitting without a jury and must be
based on clear and convincing evidence showing that one of the grounds for ter-
mination exists. 1 Chancery courts are courts of record subject to the Mississippi
Rules of Civil Procedure and the Mississippi Rules of Evidence, which are mod-
eled after the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure and Federal Rules of Evidence.
It is undisputed that M.L.B. was accorded procedural protections beyond those
required by previous decisions of the United States Supreme Court. Petitioner
received notice and a hearing in front of an unbiased decision maker trained in
the law. She was represented by an attorney, even though the Due Process
Clause does not require this in every case.92 Through her attorney, she was
allowed to submit testimony and documentation on her own behalf and to cross-
examine adverse witnesses. Finally, her rights were terminated only after a find-
81. Id. at 332. See also Board of Regents v. Roth, 408 U.S. 564, 569-72 (1972).
82. Mathews, 424 U.S. at 333.
83. Id. at 335.
84. Id. (citation omitted).
85. Id. at 343.
86. See Santosky v. Kramer, 455 U.S. 745, 775 (1982).
87. Miss. CODE ANN. § 93-15-105(1) (1972).
88. MISS. CODE ANN. § 93-15-107 (1972).
89. Id.
90. MISS. CODE ANN. § 93-15-105 (1) (1972).
91. Miss. CODE ANN. § 93-15-109 (1972).
92. Lassiter v. Department of Social Servs. of Durham County, 452 U.S. 18, 24 (1981).
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ing by the Chancellor that the statutory requirements had been met by clear and
convincing evidence, as required by Santosky.93
In M.L.B., the underlying dispute was between two private litigants. The State
did not initiate the termination proceedings but only provided the adjudicatory
forum and the substantive standard to be applied by the chancery judge. Despite
this fact, the majority treated this case like a criminal prosecution by the State,
holding that M.L.B. was "endeavoring to defend against the State's destruction of
her family bonds."'94 M.L.B. was paired with Mayer because "[1]ike a defendant
resisting criminal conviction, she seeks to be spared from the State's devastating-
ly adverse action."9
The fact that the State was not involved in the prosecution of this case was
simply ignored in this part of the Court's analysis. Perhaps this is because the
actions of the State in M.L.B. were substantially different from the actions of the
State in a criminal prosecution. In any criminal prosecution the State is a party
to the action and is seeking to take "devastatingly adverse action" against the
defendant.96 No such role was played by the State in M.L.B.. The only state actor
in this case was the chancery judge. Therefore, to reach the conclusion that it
did, the majority must have concluded that the chancery judge was in the position
of the prosecuting attorney in a criminal action and, thus, not an unbiased deci-
sion maker. However, there were no allegations, evidence, or finding by the
Court that the judge acted as anything other than a fair and impartial decision
maker. Nor did the majority make any distinction between termination proceed-
ings initiated by private persons versus those brought by the State. This means
that in the future when petitioners attempt to extend the rights granted in ML.B.
to other actions involving "important" rights, the Court will begin with the pre-
sumption that the trial judge is not an impartial decisionmaker, even in those
cases initiated by private parties. Furthermore, it will make no difference that
more safeguards are in place to reduce the risk of error when the -State initiates
an action versus when a private individual brings the action.
The majority did not distinguish between termination proceedings initiated by
the State and those initiated by private individuals, despite the substantial differ-
ence in the two kinds of actions. When the State initiates a termination proceeding
there are numerous additional procedures in place which are designed to further
limit the risk of error. 7 These procedures include four hearings and administrative
efforts by the Department of Human Services to reunite the parent and child.98
The process begins when the Department receives a report of an abused or
neglected child.9 An investigation is done, and a recommendation is made."' If
93. Santosky v. Kramer, 455 U.S. 745, 769 (1982).
94. M.L.B. v. S.L.J., 117 S. Ct. 555, 568 (1996).
95. Id.
96. Id.
97. See Miss. CODE ANN. §§ 43-21-301 to -701 (1972).
98. Id. §§ 43-21-309, -557, -603.
99. Id. § 43-21-353.
100. Id. § 43-21-357.
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there is an emergency situation, the youth court may issue an order allowing the
Department to take custody of the child. 1 Within forty-eight hours, a shelter
hearing is held to determine whether there is probable cause.02 Verbal or written
notice of this hearing is given to the parent, who may attend and participate in
the hearing." 3 If the court determines that continued custody is necessary, a peti-
tion to adjudicate the status of the child is filed within five days. 104 The hearing
is a trial on the merits.0 ' A summons is served on the parents, and they are
allowed to fully participate in the trial.'0 6 If it is determined that a child is
neglected or abused a dispositional hearing is held to determine what to do with
the child.107 The statutes provide that a continuing effort be made to reunite the
child and parent.'0 8 A permanent case plan is then prepared by the Department in
an attempt to reunite parent and child. All case plans are reviewed annually by
the Foster Care Review Board, which is judicial in nature. The parent is
informed in writing of this review.
A termination proceeding is considered only after all efforts to return the child
to the parent have failed and it is determined to be in the best interest of the
child. This determination is made only after the case plan is reviewed by a social
worker, his or her supervisor, the youth court or the Foster Care Review Board,
and the administration of the Department with input from the Office of the
Attorney General. Generally, the State initiates a termination proceeding only
after all efforts by the agency have failed and only after the child has been out of
the custody of the parent for at least a year. The net result of these proceedings is
an assurance that the risk of error in a termination proceeding is minimal.0 9
Since the issues in M.L.B. do not arise until after a court of competent jurisdic-
tion has decreed that a petitioner's parental rights should be terminated, the prin-
ciples established in the paternity cases previously decided by the Court should
have been deemed relevant. These cases establish that substantive family rights
depend, in part, on parental conduct. As stated in Caban v. Mohammed,
"[p]arental rights do not spring full-blown from the biological connection
between parent and child. They require relationships more enduring.""11 In
101. Id. § 43-21-307.
102. Id. § 43-21-309.
103. Id. § 43-21-309(2).
104. Id. §43-21-451.
105. Id. § 43-21-603.
106. Id. § 43-21-501.
107. Id. §§ 43-21-601, -603.
108. See Id. §§ 43-21-601 to -701.
109. With the addition of the rights granted in M.L.B., it is arguable that when the State
brings a termination action there are as many procedural protections in place to lessen the risk of
error as in a criminal case.
110. Caban v. Mohammed, 441 U.S. 380, 397 (1979) (Stewart, J., dissenting). Caban also provides that:
Although some Members of the Court have concluded that greater protection is due the "private
realm of family life," this appeal does not fall within that realm because whatever family life once
surrounded appellant, his children, and appellee... has long since dissolved through no fault of the
State's. In fact, it is the State, rather than appellant, that may rely in this case on the importance of
the family insofar as it is the State that is attempting to foster the establishment and privacy of new
and legitimate adoptive families.
Id. at 414 n.27 (citations omitted).
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Quillion v. Walcott, the Court held that neither the consent nor a showing of
unfitness of the natural father was necessary for adoption in a situation where the
father had not raised or legitimatized his children.111 As stated in Lehr v.
Robertson, "the Court has emphasized the paramount interest in the welfare of
children and has noted that the rights of the parents are a counterpart of the
responsibilities they have assumed." '12 Furthermore, "the importance of the
familial relationship, to the individuals involved and to the society, stems from
the emotional attachments that derive from the intimacy of daily association, and
from the role it plays in 'promot[ing] a way of life' through the instruction of
children.., as well as from the fact of blood relationship." '113
M.L.B. did not allege that she was a good parent. Instead, she alleged that the
evidence was not clear and convincing as to establish that her parental rights
should be terminated." ' If this case had been treated like the biological father
cases, M.L.B.'s property rights arguably would have been something less than
fundamental, thus requiring less constitutional protection because they would
have been balanced against the best interests of the children. However, the
majority in M.L.B. rejected a comparison to the paternity cases. " Thus, it would
appear that these standards apply only to biological fathers and that a biological
mother retains a fundamental interest in her relationship to her children regard-
less of her actions.
Although not relying on due process alone, the majority did use parts of the
Mathews analysis to justify its decision. '18 For example, the majority noted that
"in the tightly circumscribed category of parental status termination cases,
appeals are few, and not likely to impose an undue burden on the State." '17
Additionally, the majority analyzed the risk of error based on the procedures
used when it pointed out that of the eight reported challenges to termination
orders made on the merits, three were reversed. 8
From a Mathews point of view, there are at least two problems with this analo-
gy. First, rates of reversal and statistics are not necessarily relevant to an assess-
ment of the risk of an erroneous deprivation based on the procedures used. As
stated in Mathews, "[b]are statistics rarely provide a satisfactory measure of the
fairness of a decisionmaking process." '19 Second, if it is determined that statis-
tics are relevant, it would seem that the more appropriate comparison is between
the number of cases handled by the court system and the number that are eventu-
ally reversed by an appellate court. While there are no statistics showing the
111. Quillion v. Walcott, 434 U.S. 246, 255 (1978).
112. Lehr v. Robertson, 463 U.S. 248, 257 (1983).
113. Id. at 261 (citation omitted). See also Michael H. v. Gerald D., 491 U.S. 110, 122 (1989) ("In an attempt
to limit and guide interpretation of the Clause, we have insisted not merely that the interest denominated as a
'liberty' be 'fundamental' (a concept that in isolation, is hard to objectify), but also that it be an interest tradi-
tionally protected by our society.").
114. Respondent's Brief at 24, M.L.B. v. S.L.J., 117 S. Ct. 555 (1996) (No. 95-853).
115. M.L.B. v. S.L.J., 117 S. Ct. 555, 557 (1996).
116. Id.
117. Id.
118. Id. at 560n.3.
119. Mathews v. Eldridge, 424 U.S. 319, 346 (1976).
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exact number of termination of parental rights cases filed in the lower courts of
the State of Mississippi over the last sixteen years, the reports show that 194 such
cases were filed in the lower courts in 1995.120 If it is assumed that this number
is consistent over the last sixteen years, that would mean that a little over 3,100
cases were filed during that time with only three reversals on the merits. Thus,
the more relevant statistics would be a reversal rate of approximately one in one
thousand.
The states that either provide for in forma pauperis appeals, including tran-
scripts, in civil cases generally,121 or that specifically provide for in forma pau-
peris appeals, including transcripts, in termination of parental rights cases are
cited by the majority in support of its opinion. 22 However, the fact that some
states have provided for informa pauperis civil appeals through legislative enact-
ment does not have any relevance to constitutional entitlement, nor should it
require the Mississippi Legislature to prioritize its budget in the same manner.
To the contrary, the only conclusion to be derived from these facts is that the
decision to fund in forma pauperis civil appeals should be left to the discretion
of the legislative bodies of each state.
Although the majority rejected a purely due process foundation for its conclu-
sions, Justice Kennedy, in a concurring opinion, argued that the case should be
reversed solely on that basis. 2 He stated that this conclusion was based on "the
decisions addressing procedures involving the rights and privileges inherent in
family and personal relations." '24 However, these decisions only establish that
the parent-child relationship is of a fundamental nature and do not address "fun-
damental fairness" for appellate due process purposes. Further, these cases
establish that the magnitude of interests in termination of parental rights cases is
much less than in criminal cases.
120. Respondent's Brief at 28, M.L.B. v. S.L.J., 117 S. Ct. 555 (1996) (No. 95-853) (derived from a printout
provided by the Court Administrator's Office which provides a breakdown by county of the various types of
cases).
121. See, e.g., ALASKA R. ApP. P. 209(a)(3) (1996); CONN. R. App. P. 4017 (1996); D.C. CODE ANN. § 15-712
(1995); IDAHO CODE § 31-3220(5) (1996); ILL. ANN. STAT., ch. 735, § 5/5-105.5(b) (Supp. 1996); Ky. REv. STAT.
ANN. § 453.190 (Banks-Baldwin 1991); LA. CODE Civ. P ANN., art. 5185 (Supp. 1996); ME. R. CIv. P. 91(f)
(1996); MINN. STAT. § 563.01, subd. 3 (1994); Mo. RE. STAT. § 512.150 (1994); NEB. REv. STAT. § 25-2306
(1995); NEv. REv. STAT. § 12.015 (1995); N.M. STAT. ANN. § 39-3-12 (Michie 1991); N.Y. C.P.L.R. § 1102(b)
(McKinney 1976); OR. REv. STAT. § 21.605(3)(a) (1991); PA. R. JUD. ADMIN. 5000.2(h) (1996); TEX. R. App. P.
530)(1) (1996); VT. R. App. P. 10(b)(4) (1996); WASH. R. Ap. P. 15.4 (1996); W. VA. CODE § 59-2-1(a) (Supp.
1996); Girouard v. Circuit Court for Jackson County, 454 N.W.2d 792 (Wis. 1990).
122. See, e.g., CAL. FAMILY CODE ANN. § 7895(c) (West 1994); COLO. REV. STAT. § 19-3-609 (Supp. 1996);
KAN. STAT. ANN. § 38-1593 (1986); MICH. R. P. CT. 5.974(H)(3) (1996); Appeal in Pima County v. Howard, 540
P.2d 642 (Ariz. 1975); Nix v. Department of Human Resources, 225 S.E.2d 306 (1976); Chambers v. District
Court of Dubuque County, 152 N.W.2d 818 (Iowa 1967); Karren v. Hennepin County Welfare Dep't, 159
N.W2d 402 (Minn. 1968); In re Dotson, 367 A.2d 1160 (N.J. 1976); State ex rel. Heller v. Miller, 399 N.E.2d
66 (Ohio 1980); Exparte Cauthen, 354 S.E.2d 381 (S.C. 1987).
123. M.L.B. v. S.L.J., 117 S.Ct. 555, 570 (1996) (Kennedy, J., concurring) (citing Mathews, 424 U.S. at 335.
124. Id. at 570 (citing Boddie v. Connecticut, 401 U.S. 371 (1971); Lassiter v. Department of Social Servs. of
Durham County, 452 U.S. 18 (1981); and Santosky v. Kramer, 455 U.S. 745 (1982)). Justice Kennedy reached
the same result as Justice Harlan's dissent in Griffin and subsequent cases that appellate review of criminal con-
victions were mandated by procedural due process. See, e.g., Douglas v. California, 372 U.S. 353, 361, 363-64
(1963) (Harlan, J., dissenting); Griffin v. Illinois, 351 U.S. 12, 36 (1956) (Harlan, J., dissenting). This interpre-
tation was subsequently accepted as to civil access fees in Boddie, 401 U.S. 371, when Justice Harlan wrote the
majority opinion invalidating the fee requirement on due process grounds.
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The concurring opinion also concluded that "given the existing appellate struc-
ture in Mississippi, the realities of the litigation process, and the fundamental
interests at stake in this particular proceeding, the State may not erect a bar in the
form of transcript and filing costs beyond this petitioner's means." 2' Thus,
Justice Kennedy would extend the decision in Boddie to require appellate court
access to indigents whenever a fundamental right is impinged.12 However, the
fundamental nature of the marriage relationship was not discussed at any length
and was not directly relevant to the analysis used by the Boddie majority.
Instead, the decision was based on the requirements of Mathews and the conclu-
sion that persons who are forced into the judicial process to vindicate fundamen-
tal rights must be given a meaningful opportunity to be heard. 27 Thus, the only
question is whether the State has provided a process that is "fundamentally fair"
under the circumstances of each particular situation. Therefore, Justice Kennedy
apparently concluded that the procedures used in the chancery courts of the State
of Mississippi do not provide a hearing that meets the "fundamental fairness"
requirement of Mathews. However, no such allegations were made by petitioner
in this case.
Petitioner in M.L.B. did not allege that she was denied a meaningful opportuni-
ty to be heard, nor did she allege that the process was not "fundamentally fair."
Further, she did not allege that the chancery judge applied the wrong standard of
law or that he was an unbiased decisionmaker. Finally, she did not allege that,
like criminal law, termination of parental rights cases were being used or histori-
cally had been used for improper means such as suppression of speech or other
protected activities. Instead, she took the position that the Due Process and
Equal Protection Clauses of the Fourteenth Amendment require that she be
accorded the same appeal available to those who can afford it. '28 Prior to termi-
nation of her parental rights, M.L.B., with the assistance of counsel, was accord-
ed a full evidentiary hearing on the merits in front of a judge trained in the law.
She was allowed to testify, to call witnesses on her behalf and to cross-examine
adverse witnesses. Her parental rights were terminated only after the hearing
and a finding by the chancery judge that there was clear and convincing evidence
that the statutory requirements for termination had been shown.129
Why was the majority opinion based upon an amalgamation of due process and
equal protection rather than Justice Kennedy's due process argument? After all,
this case can be viewed as an attempt by petitioner to extend the decision in
Boddie, requiring trial court access based solely on due process grounds, to the
125. M.L.B., 117 S. Ct. at 570 (Kennedy, J., concurring).
126. A second requirement for trial court access in Boddie was that there be no effective alternative to court
access. Boddie, 401 U.S. at 376. Therefore, it can be concluded that if there are effective alternatives to court
access then there is no impingement. Thus, court access was required in Boddie because of the presence of a
fundamental right and the fact that there was no effective alternative to access. Id. Whereas, in United States v.
Kras, 409 U.S. 434, 445 (1973), and Ortwein v. Schwab, 410 U.S. 656, 659-60 (1973), access was denied
because there were alternatives to access and thus no impingement.
127. Boddie v. Connecticut, 401 U.S. 371, 377 (1971).
128. M.L.B., 117 S. Ct. at 559.
129. Id. at 559-60.
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appellate level. Moreover, any problems with the opinion in Boddie could have
been resolved by simply interpreting Boddie to require court access whenever a
fundamental right is implicated. Perhaps the majority accepted Justice Douglas'
warning in Boddie regarding due process: "I do not see the length of the road we
must follow if we accept my Brother Harlan's invitation.""13 The length of this
road would most certainly include appellate court access for all indigents appeal-
ing adverse decisions implicating fundamental rights. In any event, this case
illustrates the problems of extending court access solely on the basis of procedur-
al due process.
The decision in Boddie was a logical application of the requirements of
Mathews because the appellants had been denied any hearing and there was no
alternative to a court proceeding. The decision was based on the "two important
principles" of due process: (1) persons who are forced into the judicial process
must be given a meaningful opportunity to be heard,"' and (2) a facially valid
law may be invalid as applied to a particular person.132 However, the majority in
Boddie also adopted a no-effective-alternative approach. This approach provided
that access claims should be rejected "where recognized, effective alternatives for
the adjustment of differences remain."'33 The later decision by the Kras Court
addressing waiver of bankruptcy filing fees, however, would waive fees only
where the indigent had no alternative at all because "[h]owever unrealistic the
remedy may be in a particular situation, a debtor, in theory, and often in actuality,
may adjust his debts by negotiated agreement with his creditors." '34 Therefore, it
can be concluded that a successful trial court access challenge based solely on
due process must involve a fundamental right,1 31 which cannot be vindicated
except through the courts, and the complete denial of access to the court system.
There is no dispute that the decision in Boddie would be controlling if the issue
in M.L.B. involved access to the trial court. Both cases implicate fundamental
rights which can be vindicated only through the courts. The problem from a due
process point of view in M.L.B. is that petitioner therein was accorded all process
and rights that she was entitled to under Boddie. Therefore, to have based its deci-
sion solely on due process, as contemplated by the decision in Mathews, the Court
would have had to conclude that the hearing in the chancery court not only failed
to meet the requirements of "fundamental fairness" but also that a fundamentally
130. Boddie, 401 U.S. at 385 (Douglas, J., concurring in result). Justice Douglas concurred in the result but
would have based the decision on the Equal Protection Clause and the decision in Griffin v. Illinois, 351 U.S.
12(1956).
131. Boddie, 401 U.S. at 377.
132. Id. at 379.
133. Id. at 375-76.
134. United States v. Kras, 409 U.S. 434, 445 (1973).
135. The majority in Boddie acknowledged that a fundamental right was implicated when it stated: "As this
court on more than one occasion has recognized, marriage involves interests of basic importance in our soci-
ety." Boddie, 401 U.S. at 376.
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fair hearing could not be obtained in that court.13 However, petitioner in M.L.B.
did not allege that the proceeding in the chancery court was not "fundamentally
fair." Moreover, Mississippi law provides extensive safeguards in all termination
of parental rights cases to assure accurate decisions at the trial court level. '37
An extension of the decision in Boddie to the appellate level would have far-
reaching consequences. It would inevitably mean that appellate court access
would be necessary for due process purposes to meet "fundamental fairness" in
all cases wherein fundamental rights are implicated. This would most certainly
include all domestic relations cases. As pointed out in the dissent, this could
include paternity suits,138 custody determinations,139 divorce, 40 challenges to zon-
ing ordinances with impact on families," ' and foreclosure actions. 2 For sub-
stantive due process purposes, various interests involving freedom of choice in
sexual and family matters have been recognized by the Court as fundamental.
This general interest has been termed the right of privacy and includes the right
to use and to distribute contraceptives,143 the right to seek an abortion,144 the right
to view obscene material in the privacy of one's home,14 and the right to live in
an extended family.146 Moreover, a situation would be created wherein a defen-
dant with the ability to pay, whose rights were being taken away, would be forced
to pay thousands of dollars in order to receive minimum due process. Such a
holding would have created a vast new constitutional right potentially increasing
the costs and administrative burdens on the court system. The Court was obvi-
ously not prepared to take that leap in 1996.
B. Equal Protection
The Equal Protection Clause forbids statutes and regulations from distinguish-
ing between individuals on the basis of arbitrary or invidious classifications. 47
Unless a statute provokes "strict judicial scrutiny" by interfering with a "funda-
mental right" or discriminating against a "suspect class," it will ordinarily sur-
136. This would be contrary to the logical assumption from Mathews v. Eldridge, 424 U.S. 319 (1976), that a
"fundamentally fair" hearing can be had in the Court of first instance. Of course, achieving "fundamental fair-
ness" may require the institution of additional safeguards. See Lassiter v. Department of Social Servs., 452
U.S. 18 (1981) (requiring court appointed counsel in some termination of parental rights cases), and Santosky v.
Kramer, 455 U.S. 745 (1982) (requiring "clear and convincing" standard of proof in termination of parental
rights cases).
137. See Miss. CODE ANN. §§ 43-21-301 to -701 (1972).
138. See Little v. Streater, 452 U.S. 1, 13 (1981).
139. See Zakrewski v. Fox, 87 F.3d 1011, 1013-14 (8th Cir. 1996).
140. See Boddie, 401 U.S. at 382-83.
141. See Moore v. City of East Cleveland, 431 U.S. 494 (1977).
142. See Lindsey v. Normet, 405 U.S. 56, 89-90 (1972) (Douglas, J., dissenting in part).
143. See Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479 (1965).
144. See Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113, 153 (1973).
145. See Stanley v. Georgia, 394 U.S. 557, 564 (1969).
146. See Moore, 431 U.S. at 499.
147. Plyler v. Doe, 457 U.S. 202, 213 (1982) ("The Equal Protection Clause was intended to work nothing
less than the abolition of all caste-based and invidious class-based legislation.").
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vive an equal protection attack so long as the challenged classification is ratio-
nally related to a legitimate governmental purpose.'"
Four classifications are currently recognized by the United States Supreme
Court as suspect or semi-suspect: (1) classifications based on race, ethnicity, or
national origin; 49 (2) state classifications based on resident alienage;' (3) clas-
sifications based on gender;"5' and (4) classifications based on illegitimacy.'52
Those unable to pay access fees are not a suspect class.' 3 Thus, unless it impli-
cates a fundamental interest, an access fee will be upheld for equal protection
purposes as long as it is rationally related to a legitimate state interest.'
5 4
Courts have developed numerous tests to determine whether a right is funda-
mental. Most courts apply one of the following tests: (1) whether the alleged
right is "deeply rooted in this Nation's history and tradition";' (2) whether it is
"explicitly or implicitly protected by the Constitution";5 6 or (3) whether the
alleged right is "implicit in the concept of ordered liberty."'
' 57
While the decision in this case was said to be based upon an amalgamation of
the Due Process and Equal Protection Clauses of the Fourteenth Amendment, the
majority also apparently concluded that the fundamental right of maintaining the
parent-child relationship had been impinged." However, there is no suggestion
that the State does not have the power and duty to terminate a parent's rights in
the appropriate circumstances. Indeed, the State has a compelling interest in this
regard which would survive any level of scrutiny. To conclude otherwise would
be contrary to numerous cases holding that reasonable regulations on fundamen-
148. See, e.g., San Antonio Indep. Sch. Dist. v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 1, 16-17 (1973); Plyler, 457 U.S. at 216-
17; Lyng v. International Union, United Auto., Aerospace, & Agric. Implement Workers of Am., UAW, 485 U.S.
360, 370 (1988); and Kadrmas v. Dickinson Pub. Sch., 487 U.S. 450, 457-58 (1988).
149. See, e.g., Korematsu v. United States, 323 U.S. 214, 216 (1944); Hirabayashi v. United States, 320 U.S.
81, 100 (1943).
150. See, e.g., Graham v. Richardson, 403 U.S. 365, 372 (1971).
151. See, e.g., Mississippi Univ. for Women v. Hogan, 458 U.S. 718 (1982).
152. See, e.g., Matthews v. Lucas, 427 U.S. 495, 505 (1976).
153. Harris v. McRae, 448 U.S. 297, 323 (1980); Maher v. Roe, 432 U.S. 464, 470-71 (1977); San Antonio
Indep. Sch. Dist. v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 1, 29 (1973).
154. See, e.g., United States v. Kras, 409 U.S. 434, 447-48 (1973); Lindsley v. Natural Carbonic Gas Co., 220
U.S. 61, 78 (1911) (if no strict scrutiny, the legislation will be upheld unless it is "without any reasonable basis
and.., is purely arbitrary").
155. Moore v. City of East Cleveland, 431 U.S. 494, 503 (1977) (plurality opinion) (holding invalid an Ohio
housing ordinance that limited occupancy of a dwelling to members of only a few categories of related individ-
uals).
156. San Antonio Indep. Sch. Dist. v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 1, 17 (1973) (upholding Texas system of financing
public education through property taxes to the detriment of the schools in less wealthy neighborhoods). This
case also addressed wealth disparity as follows: "[A]t least where wealth is involved, the Equal Protection
Clause does not require absolute equality or precisely equal advantages." Id. at 24 (citing Bullock v. Carter,
405 U.S. 134, 137, 149 (1972); Mayer v. City of Chicago, 404 U.S.189, 194 (1971); Draper v. Washington, 372
U.S. 487, 495-96 (1963); Douglas v. California, 372 U.S. 353, 357 (1963)).
157. Palko v. Connecticut, 302 U.S. 319, 324-25 (1937) (discussing constitutional right to certain privileges
and immunities), overruled on other grounds, Benton v. Maryland, 395 U.S. 784 (1969).
158. Otherwise, prepayment of appeal costs should have been upheld as rationally related to a legitimate state
interest.
[VOL. 18:19
1998] TERMINATION OF PARENTAL RIGHTS CASES
tal rights are permissible."5 9 Therefore, if the chancery court had the power to
terminate petitioner's parental rights in this case, then there could not possibly be
an impingement of that relationship unless it were concluded that the hearing in
the tribunal of first instance was not "fundamentally fair" as required by
Mathews."6 On the other hand, if the trial was "fundamentally fair" then the only
right at issue would be the right to a civil appeal. However, the majority made no
finding that the right to a civil appeal is a fundamental right. 6 ' Moreover, the
majority reaffirmed that due process does not require an appeal process, even in
criminal cases." 2 Therefore, unlike the decisions in Williams v. Illinois,63 and
Harper v. Virginia Board of Elections,6 " there was no direct impingement of a
fundamental right in this case.
The actions of the State in this case consist of providing a discretionary appeal
after all process, required in termination of parental rights cases, has been
accorded in the trial court. The statute at issue is facially neutral and applies to
all civil appeals and all parties. Therefore, it does not, on its face, penalize the
exercise of particular rights or penalize the petitioner while subsidizing others. 6
However, it was necessary to conclude that a fundamental right had been penal-
ized in order to avoid the well-established principle that the State is not required
to subsidize the exercise of even fundamental rights.
For example, in Harris v. McRae the Court held that medicaid need not fund
abortions even though abortion is a constitutionally protected alternative.
166
Another example is that offered by Justice Harlan, dissenting in Griffin, of con-
ditioning an education on the payment of tuition.67 If conditioning an education
on the payment of tuition did not create a discriminatory classification, then dis-
criminatory classifications could not be created by any other reasonable charges
by the State for the services it provides, otherwise "[t]he resulting classification
159. See, e.g., Lyng v. Castillo, 477 U.S. 635, 638 (1986) (holding that federal food stamp program amend-
ments narrowing the definition of household did not burden a fundamental right because it did not directly and
substantially interfere with family living arrangements); Zablocki v. Redhail, 434 U.S. 374, 386 (1978) (noting
that reasonable regulations of the fundamental right to marry may legitimately be imposed); Califano v. Jobst,
434 U.S. 47, 52-54 (1977) (upholding regulation terminating benefits upon marriage as rationally related to
governmental interest).
160. Mathews v. Eldridge, 424 U.S. 319 (1976). However, as previously noted, petitioner did not allege that
the proceeding in the chancery court was not "fundamentally fair."
161. Indeed, such a finding would have resulted in a vast new constitutional right implicating all cases, both
civil and criminal.
162. M.L.B. v. S.L.J., 117 S. Ct. 555, 560-561 (1996).
163. 399 U.S. 235 (1970) (invalidating law that required continued incarceration beyond the statutory maxi-
mum for those who could not pay their fines).
164. 383 U.S. 663 (1966) (striking down a poll tax which directly interfered with the fundamental right to
vote in state elections).
165. Cf Minneapolis Star & Tribune Co. v. Minnesota Comm'r of Revenue, 460 U.S. 575, 592 (1983) (hold-
ing that state tax exemption statute, which effectively eliminated the tax burden of smaller newspapers, "begins
to resemble more a penalty for a few of the largest newspapers than an attempt to favor struggling smaller
enterprises."); Sherbert v. Verner, 374 U.S. 398, 406 (1963) (holding that state unemployment compensation
statute, by denying benefits to those unemployed for religious, rather than economic reasons, "effectively
penalizes the free exercise of... constitutional liberties.").
166. Harris v. McRae, 448 U.S. 297, 326 (1980). See also Lyng v. International Union, 485 U.S. 360, 368
(1988) ("[A] legislature's decision not to subsidize the exercise of a fundamental right does not infringe the
right."); and Regan v. Taxation with Representation of Wash., 461 U.S. 540, 551 (1983) (rejecting the argument
that the exercise of constitutional rights includes an affirmative government funding obligation).
167. Griffin v. Illinois, 351 U.S. 12, 35 (1956) (Harlan, J., dissenting).
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would be invidious in all cases, and an invidious classification offends equal pro-
tection regardless of the seriousness of the consequences." '68 Relying on the
long-held view that the Constitution is a negative document, the Court has also
held that "a legislature's decision not to subsidize the exercise of a fundamental
right does not infringe the right, and thus is not subject to strict scrutiny."'
169
Finally, in DeShaney v. Winnebago County Department of Social Services, the
Court stated that "our cases have recognized that the Due Process Clauses gener-
ally confer no affirmative right to governmental aid, even where such aid may be
necessary to secure life, liberty, or property interests of which the government
itself may not deprive the individual."'70
The majority opinion in M.L.B. relied, at least in part, on the disparate impact
theory of equal protection. The Court's action in distinguishing Washington v.
Davis,17' based upon the fact that not all blacks were impacted in Davis, as
opposed to all indigents in the present case, illustrates at least some reliance on
disparate impact theory."7 The Court in Davis rejected the claim that "a law,
neutral on its face and serving ends otherwise within the power of government to
pursue, is invalid under the Equal Protection Clause simply because it may affect
a greater proportion of one race than of another." '73 Thus, the Fourteenth
Amendment was not violated, in the absence of discriminatory intent, "solely
because it has a racially disparate impact." '174 The opinion quoted Justice
Harlan's dissents in Griffin and Douglas as to the serious consequences that
would result from a different conclusion. As stated therein, subjecting a neutral
statute to strict scrutiny because it benefits one race more than another "would be
far reaching and would raise serious questions about, and perhaps invalidate, a
whole range of tax, welfare, public service, regulatory, and licensing statutes that
may be more burdensome to the poor and to the average black than to the more
affluent white." ' This is in accord with the holding in Harris v. McRae that:
The equal protection component of the Fifth Amendment prohibits only pur-
poseful discrimination, and when a facially neutral federal statute is challenged
on equal protection grounds, it is incumbent upon the challenger to prove that
Congress "selected or reaffirmed a particular course of action at least in part
'because of', not merely 'in spite of', its adverse effects upon an identifiable
group.1 76
168. Id. Justice Harlan also addressed the "disparate impact" theory of equal protection as follows: "[N]o
economic burden attendant upon the exercise of a privilege bears equally upon all, and in other circumstances
the resulting differentiation is not treated as an invidious classification by the State, even though discrimination
against 'indigents' by name would be unconstitutional." Id.
169. Regan v. Taxation with Representation of Wash., 461 U.S. 540, 549 (1983).
170. Deshaney v. Winnebago County Dep't of Social Servs., 489 U.S. 189, 196 (1989).
171. 426 U.S. 229 (1976).
172. M.L.B. v. S.L.J., 117 S. Ct. 555, 569 (1996).
173. Davis, 426 U.S. at 242.
174. Id. at 239.
175. Id. at 248 (footnote omitted).
176. Harris v. McRae, 448 U.S. 297, 323-24 n.26 (citations omitted).
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As stated by the dissent in M.L.B., "[t]he lesson of Davis is that the Equal
Protection Clause shields only against purposeful discrimination: A disparate
impact, even upon members of a racial minority, the classification of which we
have been most suspect, does not violate equal protection."'77 Such a conclusion
is also supported by various cases, ignored by the majority in their analysis,
wherein the Court had rejected challenges to statutes affecting poor persons
receiving food stamps; 7 8 regulations affecting poor persons getting married;179
and regulations affecting poor persons seeking a medically necessary abortion. 8
As concluded by the dissent, there is no reasoned distinction between the cases
which have rejected disparate impact equal protection challenges and state subsi-
dies for poor persons seeking to exercise fundamental rights versus state funding
for a discretionary appeal. 8
To put this case in an Equal Protection Clause framework certain conclusions
have to be drawn. As previously discussed, prior equal protection decisions in
the civil area required a direct impingement of a fundamental right to evoke strict
scrutiny. However, the majority does not discuss either a direct impingement or
the level of scrutiny to be applied in this case. 82 Therefore, if this is an equal
protection case then it has to be assumed that the majority concluded that denial
of appellate court access because of inability to pay costs is a direct impingement
of whatever right is sought to be preserved and that the actions of the State are to
be strictly construed. 183 Consequently, the decision in this case would be applica-
ble to all cases wherein fundamental'rights are involved. However, the majority
expends significant effort emphasizing the conclusion in Lassiter v. Department
of Social Services of Durham County184 that termination decrees "work[ ] a
unique kind of deprivation."'85 The majority also attempts to assure that its hold-
177. M.L.B., 117 S. Ct. at 573 (Thomas, J., dissenting). The dissent also cites Personnel Administrator of
Mass. v. Feeney, 442 U.S. 256, 273 (1979) for the proposition that "[t]he Clause is not a panacea for perceived
social or economic inequity; it seeks to 'guarante[e] equal laws, not equal results."' Id.
178. See Lyng v. Castillo, 477 U.S. 635, 638 (1986) (holding that federal food stamp program amendments
narrowing the definition of household did not burden a fumdamental right because it did not directly and sub-
stantially interfere with family living arrangements).
179. Califano v. Jobst, 434 U.S. 47, 52-54 (1977) (upholding regulation terminating benefits upon marriage
as rationally related to governmental interest).
180. Harris v. McRae, 448 U.S. 297, 326 (1980) (holding that Medicaid need not fund abortions even though
abortion is a constitutionally protected alternative).
181. M.L.B., 117 S. Ct. at 574. As stated in the dissent:
I see no principled difference between a facially neutral rule that serves in some cases to prevent
persons from availing themselves of state employment, or a state-funded education, or a state-fund-
ed abortion-each of which the State may, but is not required to, provide-and a facially neutral
rule that prevents a person from taking an appeal that is available only because the State chooses to
provide it.
Id. at 574 (Thomas, J., dissenting).
182. The majority agrees that the State has a legitimate interest in offsetting the costs of its court system but
concludes that paying the costs of termination of parental rights appeals would not likely "impose an undue
burden on the State." 117 S. Ct. at 567. It would thus appear that the level of scrutiny applied in this case was
greater than rational basis. However, the opinion in Mayer, on which the Court relied in this case, did not
address the level of scrutiny either.
183. An intermediate level of scrutiny is also possible and logical based on the holding in Santosky v.
Kramer, 455 U.S. 745 (1982) that an intermediate standard of proof is applicable to termination of parental
rights cases.
184. 452 U.S. 18, 27 (1981).
185. M.L.B.,1 17 S. Ct. at 565-67, 569-70.
MISSISSIPPI COLLEGE LAW REVIEW [VOL. 18:19
ing in this case will not extend beyond termination of parental rights, noting that
the decisions in Santosky"' and Lassiter187 have not been applied to other areas of
the law. Nevertheless, as pointed out by the dissent, if the right to a free appel-
late transcript is based upon having an interest equivalent to that of a convicted
misdemeanant, then many other interests involved in civil litigation appear to
meet the standard.18 Those cases include paternity suits, 89 divorce actions, 90
child custody determinations,"' challenges to zoning ordinances that impact
families, 92 and foreclosure actions seeking to oust families from their homes.
193
A more limited interpretation of the majority opinion starts with the conclu-
sion that denial of appellate court access because of inability to pay costs is a
direct impingement of whatever right is sought to be preserved and then adds a
sliding scale of rights.194 Of course, this requires a case-by-case review and an
arbitrary cutoff of rights protected versus those not protected. The net result is
that the Court will review future challenges on a case-by-case basis and make a
determination as to whether the particular right is deemed to be important
enough to require appellate review prior to its deprivation. 9
C. Conclusion
The United States Supreme Court has now extended the right to an in forma
pauperis appeal to the civil arena, at least in termination of parental rights cases.
Like the decision in Griffin, 96 this right is said to be based upon an amalgama-
tion of the Due Process and Equal Protection Clauses of the Fourteenth
186. Santosky v. Kramer, 455 U.S. 745 (1982). This case held that a "clear and convincing" standard of proof
must be used in termination of parental rights case. "Unlike a constitutional requirement of hearings ... or
court-appointed counsel, a stricter standard of proof would reduce factual error without imposing substantial
fiscal burdens upon the State." Id. at 767 (citing Mathews v. Eldridge, 424 U.S. 319, 347 (1976)).
187. Lassiter v. Department of Social Servs., 452 U.S. 18 (1981). This case addressed the question of when
an indigent might be entitled to court appointed counsel in a termination of parental rights case. The Court
concluded that each case would have to be considered on its own merit. Id. at 31-32.
188. M.L.B., 117 S. Ct. at 576-77 (Thomas, J., dissenting).
189. In Little v. Streater, 452 U.S. 1 (1981), the Supreme Court held that the State had to provide a free blood
grouping test to an indigent defendant in a paternity action. The Court based its decision on the conclusion
that:
Apart from the putative father's pecuniary interest in avoiding a substantial support obligation and
liberty interest threatened by the possible sanctions for noncompliance, at issue is the creation of a
parent-child relationship. This Court frequently has stressed the importance of familial bonds,
whether or not legitimized by marriage, and accorded them constitutional protection. Just as the ter-
mination of such bonds demands procedural fairness, so too does their imposition.
Id. at 13 (citations omitted).
190. See Zakrewski v. Fox, 87 F3d 1011, 1013-14 (8th Cir. 1996) (holding that the father's "liberty interest in
the care, custody and management of his son has been substantially reduced by the terms of the divorce decree
and Nebraska law").
191. See Boddie v. Connecticut, 401 U.S. 371, 382-83 (1971) (stating that divorce is an "adjustment of a fun-
damental human relationship").
192. See Moore v. City of East Cleveland, 431 U.S. 494 (1977).
193. See, e.g., Lindsey v. Normet, 405 U.S. 56, 89-90 (1972) (Douglas, J., dissenting in part) ("[W]here the
right is so fundamental as the tenant's claim to his home, the requirements of due process should be more
embracing.").
194. In effect, some "fundamental rights" are more "fundamental" than others.
195. Of course, the actual analysis will involve a comparison of the rights under consideration to those of the
misdemeanant in Mayer or those of the petitioner in M.L.B.
196. Griffin v. Illinois, 351 U.S. 12 (1956).
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Amendment, presumably because it cannot be reconciled with long-standing
interpretations of either clause individually. This raises numerous questions for
possible resolution in the future. For example, can this right be made to fit with-
in the framework of traditional analysis of either due process or equal protection?
From an equal protection point of view, is this an exception to the general rule
that wealth is not a suspect class? That is, wealth becomes a suspect class sub-
jecting the state rule to strict scrutiny if the interest implicated is sufficiently
important. 97 Maybe this is more properly referred to as substantive equal protec-
tion. Or, from a due process point of view, is this an exception to the concept
that minimum due process can be accorded in the court of first instance? That is,
the combination of wealth disparity and a right of sufficient importance requires
appellate court review in order to meet "fundamental fairness" under due
process. Or will this right eventually result in a new species with a new name,
such as Equal Due Process or Due Equal Protection? If that happens then it
would be logical and practical to also establish fundamental rights which apply
only to that new species.
The more logical basis for the holding in this case is some form of fundamen-
tal rights equal protection. This would be in accord with the acknowledgment by
the majority that most of the criminal cases in this area were based on an equal
protection framework. '98 Of course, this would either require the creation of a
new set of rights to which this rule would have application or a narrowly defined
set of fundamental rights applicable only to indigent petitioners attempting to
appeal adverse decisions. This would also allow the Court to limit the impact of
its holding without having to overrule prior decisions. 99 Otherwise, the entire
civil arena would be encompassed by the new rule. This is not what the Court
wants to do. The problem is that the Court has not been able to articulate a
coherent theoretical framework for the rights that the majority wants protected
without creating a vast new constitutional right with far reaching implications.
Consequently, the result in appellate access challenges is ambiguous opinions
which have application only to the facts of each individual case.
III. IMPACT OF THIS DECISION
The impact of the decision in M.L.B. is divided into two parts: (1) immediate
impact of the decision, and (2) potential impact of the decision. Of course,
which impact ultimately prevails depends upon subsequent conclusions by the
Court as to what services and benefits must be provided by the State to those
197. This views the problem based on the right involved rather than the parties involved and thus is distin-
guished from the disparate impact theory of equal protection addressed in Washington v. Davis, 426 U.S. 229
(1976).
.198. M.L.B. v. S.L.J., 117 S. Ct. 555, 566 (1996).
199. If the decision in M.L.B. relied on disparate impact equal protection theory for its conclusions, then it
would appear that Washington v. Davis, 426 U.S. 229 (1976) and Harris v. McRae, 448 U.S. 297 (1980) were
wrongly decided.
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who cannot afford them."' However, most of those decisions are not likely to be
reached by the Court in the near future.
The immediate impact of the decision on the State will be having to absorb the
administrative burdens and costs of appeals in terminations of parental rights
decrees. This is based on the fact that the decision is limited to consideration of
parental rights cases only and the assurance by the Court that this decision does
not go beyond the area of termination of parental rights. If the decision is so lim-
ited, the actual costs to the State of Mississippi will probably not be significant.
Of the 39,475 domestic relations cases filed in the chancery courts in 1995 only
194 involved termination of parental rights."1 Furthermore, there are only sixteen
reported appeals of termination of parental rights from 1980 to 1996, with twelve
addressing the merits of a grant or denial of termination." 2 Of course, once these
appeals are available at public expense it is presumed that the numbers will
increase. While we can only speculate as to the number of appeals and their asso-
ciated costs in the future, it is assumed that both will increase. As previously
observed by the Court, "[w]e only need say that experience with the constitution-
alizing of government procedures suggests that the ultimate additional cost in
terms of money and administrative burden would not be insubstantial.""0
The potential impact of this decision is much greater than the immediate
impact. Now that the barrier between criminal and civil cases has been partially
removed, it can safely be assumed that litigants will spare no time in contending
that their interests are "fundamental" and of a similar nature as those of the peti-
tioners in Mayer and M.L.B., thereby entitling them to the same process." 4
Moreover, acceptance of these arguments would result in the opening of a
Pandora's box without principled basis for distinction. Such appeals could
include all domestic relations matters such as divorce, paternity, and child cus-
tody, as well as other cases where "important" interests are litigated.
The quantity of such subsidized cases would be significant. In 1995, there
were 63,765 civil actions filed in the chancery courts of the State of Mis-
200. Perhaps this is the reason one commentator on Court Television referred to this case as raising issues of
socialism versus capitalism with which the Court has struggled over the years.
201. Respondent's Brief at 28, M.L.B. v. S.L.J., 117 S. Ct. 555 (1996) (No. 95-853) (derived from a printout
provided by the Court Administrator's Office which provides a breakdown by county of the various types of
cases).
202. M.L.B., 117 S. Ct. at 567. See Carson v. Natchez Children's Home, 580 So. 2d 1248 (Miss. 1991);
Natural Mother v. Paternal Aunt, 583 So. 2d 614 (Miss. 1991); Vance v. Lincoln County Dep't of Pub. Welfare,
582 So. 2d 414 (Miss. 1991); In re J.D., 512 So. 2d 684 (Miss. 1987); G.M.R., Sr. v. H.E.S., 489 So. 2d 498
(Miss. 1986); Adams v. Powe, 469 So. 2d 76 (Miss. 1985); Bryant v. Cameron, 473 So. 2d 174 (Miss. 1985);
Petit v. Holifield, 443 So. 2d 874 (Miss. 1984); Ainsworth v. Natural Father, 414 So. 2d 417 (Miss. 1982); De
La Oliva v. Lowndes County Dep't of Pub. Welfare, 423 So. 2d 1328 (Miss. 1982); Doe v. Attorney W, 410 So.
2d 1312 (Miss. 1982); In reAdoption of a Female Child, 412 So. 2d 1175 (Miss. 1982).
203. Mathews v. Eldridge, 424 U.S. 319, 347 (1976).
204. The majority opinion points out that Miss. CODE ANN. §§ 41-21-83, -85 provide coverage for transcript
fees and other costs for indigents in civil commitment appeals. M.L.B., 117 S. Ct. at 560 n.2. However, this fact
should not have had any relevance to the issues before the Court because: (1) this was pursuant to statutory
enactment, not constitutional requirement; and (2) like criminal conviction and imprisonment, civil commit-
ment involves involuntary confinement.
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sissippi. °5  Of those, 39,475 were domestic relations cases. 6 This compares to
15,487 criminal dispositions and 22,476 civil filings in the circuit courts of the
State of Mississippi." 7 A breakdown of the chancery court statistics reveals that
of the 63,765 civil actions filed, 194 involved termination of parental rights,
1,027 involved custody or visitation, and 6,080 were paternity cases." 8 Of the
cases decided on the merits by the Supreme Court of Mississippi in 1995, 194
were first appeals of criminal convictions, 40 involved domestic relations, and 10
involved custody.09 Of the cases disposed of by the court of appeals in 1995,
298 were first appeals of criminal convictions, 27 involved domestic relations,
and 6 involved custody. 10 The 1996 statistics show that the Mississippi Supreme
Court issued 797 decisions, " and the court of appeals issued 663 decisions.212
These statistics indicate that if indigent appeal rights were expanded to include
just domestic relation cases, the appellate courts could be overwhelmed and the
costs to the system increased by several million dollars. For example, with
approximately 40,000 domestic relations cases having been filed in the chancery
courts in 1995, an increase of 3% in the appeal rate (1,200 cases) would almost
double the work load of the appellate courts (1,460). Consequently, it is assumed
that a corresponding increase in personnel to handle the increased work load
would be required. Additionally, if it is assumed that the appeal costs of each of
these additional cases averaged $2,500.00 (the clerk's estimated costs for prepa-
ration of the record in M.L.B.) an additional $3 million per year would have to be
expended.
Other potential impacts of the Court's ruling include: (1) there will no longer
be any deterrents to appeals filed for the purpose of harassment of the opposing
side; and (2) the delay may result in some children not being adopted. As noted
by the Court in Lassiter, the State has an interest in concluding child custody liti-
gation as rapidly as is consistent with fairness." 3 Moreover, the State has an
interest in "foster[ing] the establishment and privacy of new and legitimate adop-
tive" parents where the biological parent has abandoned the relationship." 4
Because a younger child has a greater chance of adoption, a delay of two or more
years for appellate review of a termination proceeding could determine whether
the child is adopted.
205. SUPREME COURT OF MISSISSIPPI, 1995 ANNUAL REPORT 55 (1995).
206. Respondent's Brief at 28, M.L.B. v. S.LJ., 117 S. Ct. 555 (1996) (No. 95-853) (derived from a printout
provided by the Court Administrator's Office which provides a breakdown by county of the various types of
cases).
207. SUPREME COURT OF MISSISSIPPI, 1995 ANNUAL REPORT 48 (1995).
208. Respondent's Brief at 28, M.L.B. v. S.L.J., 117 S. Ct. 555 (1996) (No. 95-853) (derived from a printout
provided by the Court Administrator's Office which provides a breakdown by county of the various types of
cases).
209. SUPREME COURT OF Mississippi, 1995 ANNUAL REPORT 23 (1995).
210. Id. at42.
211. SUPREME COURT OF MISSISSIPPI, 1996 ANNUAL REPORT 23 (1996). These decisions are broken down as
follows: 225 published written opinions, 117 per curiam decisions, 297 cases dismissed, and 158 unpublished
written opinions Id.
212. Id. at 42. These decisions are broken down as follows: 620 unpublished comprehensive opinions, 23
unpublished memorandum affirmances, and 20 cases dismissed.
213. Lassiter v. Department of Social Servs., 452 U.S. 18, 32 (1981).
214. See Caban v. Mohammed, 441 U.S. 380, 389, 414 n.27 (1979).
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IV A MYTHIC JOURNEY OR A DESCENT INTO THE ABYSS?
The second hand on the clock moved like molasses on a cold winter day and
the minute hand raced like a fan blade around the dial as I sat in the attorney
room of the United States Supreme Court hurriedly reviewing my notes and
wondering if I had adequately prepared for the barrage of probable questions in
the oral argument scheduled to begin in a few minutes. It was October 6, the
first day of the Court term, and the culmination of a long process that began in
January. This was also the end of an experience that combined mythological
symbolism with the practical realities of partisan politics.
This case originated in the Chancery Court of Tippah County where M.L.B.
was represented by a legal services attorney and S.L.J. was represented by local
counsel. After M.L.B.'s petition to appeal informa pauperis was rejected by the
Mississippi Supreme Court, the ACLU filed the petition for certiorari with the
United States Supreme Court. Later, the clerk requested that the Office of the
Attorney General respond to the petition. This is the normal procedure when a
state statute, rule, or regulation is being challenged. The State submitted a
response within the time allowed by the rules.
On April 1, 1996, (a coincidence or an omen?) the Court granted the petition.
Shortly thereafter, a scheduling order was issued, and a three step process was
begun in preparation for drafting the brief on the merits. First, it was necessary
to assimilate the pertinent cases and other legal authority that might be relevant
to the issues in the case. Organizing, labeling, and arranging the material so that
it could be found and incorporated into the brief at a later date constituted one of
the most time consuming aspects of the process. Second, it was necessary to
identify and contact persons who could provide relevant facts and identify perti-
nent documents that might be applicable to the issues under consideration.
Third, as I had never prepared a brief on the merits in this forum, I reviewed vari-
ous treatises for opinions in that regard.
Preparation included reviewing from fifty to one hundred law review articles
that touched upon some aspect of the case. Unfortunately, I found no articles
that had considered the particular issues raised in this case. This was not unex-
pected, since the Supreme Court generally grants certiorari only in those cases
raising important questions which have not previously been addressed and are
deemed, by at least five members of the Court, to be in need of resolution.
Nevertheless, reading a few thousand pages of legal text on the Fourteenth
Amendment and fundamental rights may be the dictionary definition of a combi-
nation of tedium and confusion. In any event, there were parts of some articles
that provided enlightenment.
My preparation also included reviewing Supreme Court briefs submitted in pre-
vious cases addressing termination of parental rights. Copies that could not be
found in bound volumes in the state law library were retrieved by a representative
of the National Association of Attorneys General directly from the Clerk of the
Court. Although the issues raised in these briefs were not directly on point, they
were helpful in two ways. First, it was possible to review the various arguments
made by others in similar circumstances and make an assessment of which argu-
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ments were germane and persuasive as to the issues in M.L.B. Second, the fact
that these briefs did not cite any line of cases or make any major arguments that I
had not already identified as pertinent to the issues relieved a certain amount of
anxiety. The foreboding that is associated with this form of anxiety has its origin
in the nightmare that all attorneys occasionally have of missing an important case
or issue and not becoming aware of this shortcoming until pointed out by the
judge in the middle of oral arguments. Such a faux pas would be especially dis-
concerting if made in the middle of a United States Supreme Court argument.
Petitioner's brief relied on a combination of the opinion in the Mayer" case
and a sympathy appeal. This meant that the legal foundation on which petitioner
based her right to an in forma pauperis appeal was founded upon the product of
judicial activism whereby the Court reached the result desired by the majority
without establishing or articulating any discernable principals of law. Therefore,
petitioner was asking the Court to extend to the civil arena the result reached in a
criminal case which had been an aberration when it was decided and which had
obviously been one of the more extreme examples of judicial activism.
Since it is difficult to make a logical argument in response to an illogical
premise, the State's brief was based upon an analysis of prior opinions address-
ing due process, equal protection, and fundamental rights in the civil arena.
Application of the legal principles on which those decisions were based would
either dictate denial of the relief requested or the creation of a vast new constitu-
tional right that would swallow the entire civil field. Because of the second pos-
sibility, it was necessary to point out the dire consequences of the creation of a
vast new constitutional right. In light of the fact that almost 40,000 domestic
relations cases are filed in the chancery courts of the State of Mississippi each
year, that argument was not difficult. However, as we know from the majority
opinion, the Court was not willing to create any vast new constitutional rights
but, instead, chose to craft a narrow exception to the general rule.
The next problem was to organize and prepare the brief in a logical, coherent
manner. After numerous rewrites, a final version was completed and sent to the
printer. The printer prepared all copies, delivered the appropriate number of
copies to the Court, served opposing counsel, and returned file stamped copies.
Needless to say, this service was both necessary and expensive.
Briefing in this case was completed at the end of July. At approximately the
same time, we received a notice setting the case for oral argument on October 6,
1996. Preparing for oral argument was more difficult than preparing the brief.
This required being ready to answer any question that could be asked. It was
also logical to assume that there would only be a short amount of time to present
a prepared statement before questions began to be asked by members of the
Court. Needless to say, I changed the outline for this part of the case several
times prior to presentation of the actual argument.
Since this case was set for the first day of the term, there was no opportunity to
watch another argument prior to my own. However, the National Association of
215. Mayer v. City of Chicago, 440 U.S. 173, 189 (1979).
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Attorneys General has an office in Washington that assists Attorneys General
throughout the nation, including preparation for Supreme Court arguments. Part
of this assistance includes setting up a moot court to hear and make suggestions
regarding oral arguments. The members of these moot courts are generally made
up of local attorneys who practice before the Supreme Court. This proved to be
beneficial in the organization and presentation of the argument, as well as from a
confidence building point of view.
Attending a lecture on the Supreme Court also proved to be both interesting
and beneficial. Lectures are given in the courtroom every hour on the half hour
from 9:30 a.m. to 3:30 p.m., Monday through Friday, when the Court is not in
session. The courtroom, completed in 1935, is impressive with its high ceilings,
friezes, large columns, and abundance of mahogany wood. These lectures pro-
vide information on both historical and practical aspects of the Court. The pro-
ceedings in the Court are formal and involve certain established rituals.
Examples include the wearing of black robes, simultaneous appearance of the
justices from curtains behind the bench, and the traditional beginning of each
argument with "Mr. Chief Justice, and may it please the Court." Seating in the
courtroom is also strictly controlled. Counsel for petitioner sits to the left of the
podium and counsel for respondent to the right. The attorneys waiting for the
next case to be called for argument sit at the backup tables. There are also a
number of seats inside the bar which are reserved for attorneys who have been
admitted to practice before the Court. Additionally, there are reserved seats paral-
lel to the bench on each end. Those on the right side of the courtroom are
reserved for family and friends of the justices, and visiting dignitaries, such as
the President or Attorney General of the United States. Those on the left side of
the courtroom are reserved for the members of the news media who cover the
Court. Finally, there is unreserved seating in the courtroom for members of the
public, although each attorney arguing before the Court can reserve seats for
friends and family members.
A large part of the weekend was spent in final preparation for the argument on
Monday afternoon. When I reached the limits of review tolerance on Sunday after-
noon, I put aside my notes and spent the rest of the evening watching one of the
baseball playoff games. Surprisingly, I slept soundly for eight hours that night.
On the morning of the argument, I walked to the Court and checked in with the
Office of the Clerk. All attorneys must meet with the Clerk of the Court at
approximately 9:00 a.m. on the morning of their argument. Part of the reason for
this meeting is for the clerk to remind the attorneys of various procedural matters.
Additionally, written information and the argument cards are handed out. The
argument card lists the name of the attorney, the style of the case, and instruc-
tions, including the previously mentioned traditional beginning of every argu-
ment. The argument card also serves as a pass to gain access to the courtroom.
When the briefing by the clerk was completed, I went to the courtroom. The
usher seated me in the last chair available behind the bar. The first question of
the day, from a trivia point of view, was whether Justice Scalia would be the first
justice since the 1940's to begin a term wearing a full beard. When the members
of the Court emerged through the curtain behind the bench Justice Scalia was, in
[VOL. 18:19
TERMINATION OF PARENTAL RIGHTS CASES
fact, wearing a full beard. This one fact made as many newspaper headlines as
any of the cases argued that day.
Arguments started promptly at 10:00 a.m., beginning with Turner v. FCC16
dealing with cable rights. While a very important case from a financial point of
view, it was an otherwise dry subject that evoked only information questions
from the members of the Court. When those arguments were completed both
opposing counsel and myself moved to the backup tables. Even though M.L.B.
was the third argument of the day, the Court rules require that counsel for the
next case be at the backup table in the event the prior argument ends early. At
the completion of the second argument, the Court adjourned promptly at 12:00
p.m. I chose to skip lunch rather than take advantage of the express lunch ser-
vice available in the cafeteria to those attorneys arguing cases in the afternoon.
It seemed prudent to avoid eating a meal just prior to making my first argument
in front of the United States Supreme Court.
The Court reconvened promptly at 1:00 p.m., and the argument began.
Opposing counsel made a short opening statement before Chief Justice
Rehnquist and Justice Scalia began a barrage of questions. These and other
inquiries by different members of the Court continued until the white light on the
podium indicated that five minutes were left for argument. At that point, oppos-
ing counsel reserved the remaining five minutes for rebuttal and sat down.
I got up and moved toward the podium, having reached the point of no return.
From this vantage point, the nearness to the Justices is arresting. This is not like
the United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit where the judges,
metaphorically speaking, sit up in the clouds. The Chief Justice of the United
States Supreme Court sits directly in front of the arguing attorney, approximately
six to ten feet away. Moreover, I felt surrounded because the bench has a half-
hexagonal shape that allows the Justices seated on the wings to hear and see both
counsel and each other. Thus, to address one of the Justices on the end counsel
must turn almost sideways. The actual seating of the Justices is based on seniori-
ty with the most senior sitting to the right of the Chief Justice, the second most
senior to the left of the Chief Justice, and continuing in that manner so that the
two most junior Justices sit at opposite ends of the bench.
As with opposing counsel, I was allowed to make a short opening statement
before the questions began. In the first ten minutes, questions were asked by all
Justices, with the exception of Justice Thomas. The only unanticipated question
was an inquiry as to the number of chancery judges in the State of Mississippi.
Having never had the occasion to need to know this, I had to admit that I did not
know. The last fifteen minutes of the allotted time consisted of responding to a
barrage of questions from Justice Ginsburg. During this time, I found myself
viewing this verbal sparring from a spectator's point of view, a sort of out-of-
body experience. Since Justice Ginsburg has a decidedly New York dialect and I
have somewhat of a southern dialect, it entered my mind that a third party might
view the sound of this discussion as slightly amusing. While no glaring errors
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were made in the responses, the argument reminded me of the description
penned by a United States Solicitor General of the 1950's. He stated that he
made three arguments in every case: (1) the logical, well-organized, and thor-
oughly prepared argument that he intended to present; (2) the illogical, unorga-
nized, and confused argument actually presented to the Court, and; (3) the
absolutely devastating arguments that he thought of while lying in bed the night
after the argument.
It was obvious that there was a serious ideological split in the Court on the
issues raised in this case. Chief Justice Rehnquist and Justice Scalia were clearly
against extending access rights and Justices Ginsburg, Stevens and Breyer obvi-
ously felt otherwise. Based on their questions, it was difficult to anticipate how
Justices O'Connor, Kennedy and Souter were leaning. However, it was assumed
that Justice Souter would vote with Justices Ginsburg, Stevens and Breyer and
that the case would be decided by Justices Kennedy and O'Connor. Therefore,
the decision would be either 5-4 in favor of the State or 6-3 against the State.
The argument finally ended and I emerged into the light of day on the front
steps. The news media had converged on the petitioner, and every reporter was
vieing for the opportunity to interview her. This case drew an unusual amount of
attention from the news media presumably because of its soap opera nature.
Indeed, after returning to Jackson, I received calls from such media sources as
the Washington Times and the Washington Post. Additionally, there were calls
from People Magazine, the Oliver North Radio Show, the Montel Williams Show,
and a California producer.
On December 16, 1996, the Court issued its opinion, ruling against the State in
a six to three decision. This result apparently contradicts the general consensus,
by those who have published opinions on the subject, that a majority of the Court
has an idea of federalism that reduces federal power vis-a-vis the states. These
conclusions are supported by the fact that the Court, during the 1996 term, pre-
served state's rights by rejecting a constitutional challenge to statutes banning
doctor-assisted suicide, rejecting challenges to a state law that allowed violent
sexual predators to be committed to mental institutions after completion of their
prison term, and striking provisions from federal law contained in the Religious
Restoration Act and the Brady gun control law which imposed requirements on
the states. Perhaps M.L.B. is not comparable to the cases upon which that opin-
ion relied, or maybe this is an application of some "Mississippi Rule." After all,
the opinion of the Court in M.L.B. relied upon an undefined amalgamation of
due process and equal protection which, arguably, established no usable princi-
ples and which cannot be justified under either clause. Based on this premise,
the logical conclusion is that payment of appeal costs in termination of parental
rights cases was prioritized in the State's budget because the majority felt that it
was the "right thing to do." In any event, the decision is an aberration from the
other cases raising federalism issues which were decided during the 1996 term.
The process of preparing and arguing a case in the United States Supreme
Court was an unforgettable series of events. The experience, like most things,
had both positive and negative aspects. Nevertheless, I feel fortunate to have had
an opportunity that comes to only a very small number of attorneys.
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